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Introduction
Like previous trade rounds, a significant objective of the Doha negotiating agenda is to reduce trade barriers and open up new market opportunities for WTO Members. Unlike in previous rounds, however, concern about the erosion of non-reciprocal preferences has found clear expression in the negotiating positions of dozens of WTO Members and in negotiating texts.
1 Over the years, major trading countries have extended non-reciprocal preferences to developing countries through a range of schemes aimed at promoting export growth in beneficiary countries. The schemes have met with varying success. 2 They have clearly been effective enough, however, to give rise to demands from beneficiary countries for something to be done to mitigate or compensate in some way for the loss of competitive advantage that will result from non-discriminatory (MFN) trade liberalization. These demands have surfaced in the negotiations on trade in agricultural and non-agricultural products.
We recently completed a paper on non-reciprocal preference erosion in relation to non-agricultural market access (Low et al., 2005) , and the present study applies a very similar methodology to estimate the dimensions of preference erosion risk in agriculture. The earlier paper discussed theoretical considerations underpinning the erosion question, along with a number of measurement issues. We do not repeat those discussions here. Rather, we proceed directly to a brief explanation of our methodology followed by a presentation of the preference erosion estimates..
The estimates pertain only to the preference schemes maintained by the so-called QUAD members (Canada, EU, Japan and the United States). The data are for the year 2003. Based on tariff line level information, we establish "theoretical maxima" estimates of non-reciprocal preference erosion in agriculture. The theoretical maximum is taken to be the trade weighted difference between MFN duties and preferential duties. This estimate is then subject to an adjustment factor. The adjustment 1 Strictly speaking, this is not the first time the issue has been raised. Brazil, for example, argued for the preservation of preferential margins in the context of the Tokyo Round (see Document MTN/W/2 of 26 October 1973).
2 Several studies over the years have assessed the role of preferences. See, for example, Murray (1977) , Borrman, Borrman and Steger (1981) , OECD (1983) , Sapir and Lundberg (1984) , Karsenty and Laird 2 recognizes that from the point of view of a non-reciprocal preference beneficiary, competing trade from other preference receivers -of both non-reciprocal and reciprocal preferences -does not face MFN tariff rates. When this competition from other geographical sources is taken into account it is apparent that risks from preference erosion are lower than if the relevant comparison is made simply in respect of MFN trade. Another adjustment factor that would have further reduced the estimates of preference erosion relates to utilization rates under the various preferential schemes. Data limitations have prevented inclusion of this element in the estimates. Where non-reciprocal preferences have not been fully utilized for one reason or another, an exporter is effectively at less risk from preference erosion as a consequence of MFN liberalization.
In order to focus on the value of non-reciprocal preferences, estimates are reported for those developing countries that only receive non-reciprocal preferences from at least one of the QUAD members. In other words, developing countries involved in reciprocal preferential trading arrangements with the QUAD countries in 2003 are excluded. 3 After providing our base-line estimates of adjusted risk from preference erosion, we simulate MFN tariff cuts on the basis of the G20 agriculture proposal in order to gain a sense of what such a scenario would mean by way of preference erosion among recipients of non-reciprocal preferences. This exercise is strictly illustrative and the choice of the G20 proposal as the scenario does not imply any judgement on our part as to the desirability of this outcome over any other in the agriculture negotiations. Moreover, we do not apply any simulation techniques in order to estimate the possible aggregate trade or welfare outcomes arising from MFN liberalization and the resulting erosion of preferences. Our calculations only estimate the value of potential preference erosion in terms of margins lost through MFN liberalization, multiplied by the observed trade flows of the countries concerned. This measure approximately indicates the potential loss of economic 'rent' that exporters face following MFN liberalization -that is, the loss in the extra income from which exporters benefited thanks to preferences. The results show that in net terms, some countries lose overall because of reduced preference margins, while others gain as a result of MFN cuts.
Certain observations about the limitations of the analysis are in order. Firstly, like virtually all simulations regardless of the chosen methodology, our calculations are based on trade flows that are already influenced by the protection in place. Observed trade flows would be quite different if they were "free trade" flows. Secondly, we have not attempted to simulate the possible effects of changes (1986) , Brown (1987) , Brown (1989) , UNCTAD (1999) , Ozden and Reinhardt (2003) , OECD (2003) , WTO (2004) , Grossman and Sykes (2005) . in relative prices (from MFN liberalization) on supply and demand, and therefore on trade. This could have been done with a partial equilibrium elasticity analysis but we limit ourselves to a simple comparison of what happens to the estimated value of preferences at the country level when MFN tariff rates are cut, with everything else staying the same.
The use of a partial equilibrium model to analyze the impact of MFN liberalization on preference erosion would have allowed us to assess the impact that a change in preference margin on one product would have on the exports of a substitutable product and on the redistribution of export shares across countries. In other words, we would have been able to assess the trade effects of liberalization rather than just looking at changes in the preference margins. But such estimates of the trade effects arising from eroded preference margins requires knowledge of the responsiveness of supply and demand to price changes, as well as the degree of substitution that would occur between preferential and nonpreferential suppliers. These measures of responsiveness to price changes, or elasticities, are subject to broad estimation based on limited information. It is therefore unclear what woud be gained by trying to translate the margin erosion estimate into a trade flow consequence.
Partial equilibrium analyses are limited in that they do not capture all the interactive consequences of a policy change on the economy as a whole. Analysts are well aware that policy changes have ripple effects throughout the economy, and that a comprehensive picture of the economy-wide effects of a policy change would require a general equilibrium model. In fact, a general equilibrium model, by taking into account income and resource constraints, would be able to estimate the effects of preference erosion on income as well as on trade flows. Once again, however, such models have formidable data requirements, produce highly aggregated results, and are typically sensitive to relatively small changes in assumptions. 4 Taking into account these limitations, and the utility of a high degree of disaggregation among products, exporters and import markets, we felt it was preferable to limit our examination of the preference erosion issue to the simple analysis of changes in "rents" for exporters losing preference margins.
A third limitation of the analysis is that because the estimates for this paper are all built on existing trade flows, we have no way of knowing whether a reduction in preference margins might be compensated by trade in product lines against which zero trade has been recorded in our data set. This is clearly an issue in agriculture, as will be seen below when we consider "sensitive" product 4 exclusions from the tariff cuts. Many of the selected sensitive products have zero trade flows because of the height of existing tariffs. It should be noted that this particular problem may also exist in more sophisticated analyses involving partial or general equilibrium simulations.
Several aspects of this analysis suggest that the estimates of preference erosion arising from our MFN liberalization scenario may be upper bound estimates. First, we are using applied tariff rates rather than bound rates as the simulation base-line. In the QUAD countries, most bound rates are not much higher than applied rates, but to the extent that a binding overhang exists, we are assuming deeper MFN cuts than would actually occur, thus leading to higher estimates of preference erosion. Second, we assume that all the "economic rent" that accrues from preferences goes to the exporter. In practice, some of the margin is likely to be appropriated by the importing country, which means that the loss occurring from preference erosion is correspondingly less. 5 Third, we assume that the full impact of MFN liberalization will be felt immediately following agreement on the tariff reductions. In practice, MFN cuts are likely to be phased in over several years.
Other working assumptions underlying the analysis may go either way in terms of lowering or raising the estimates of preference erosion. First, as already noted, we make no attempt to calculate preference utilization rates, and simply assume these to be 100 per cent. If utilization rates are less than 100 per cent, which is almost certainly the case in many instances, then the initial value of preferences is lower and the risk from erosion less. However, since we assume full utilization of all preferences, including reciprocal preferences, we cannot be sure whether overall, we are over-or under-estimating preference margins. Second, for lack of data for the EU, we assume that trade on all lines subject to tariff rate quotas pays the MFN out-of-quota tariff rate. 6 This means that, given a certain preferential tariff rate, as long as trade remains within quota we estimate a higher preference margin than actually exists and therefore greater risk from preference erosion. However, since uncertainty exists in respect of some tariff lines as to whether preferential rates are in or out of quota rates, there is a possibility that for these products we underestimate preference erosion.
The paper is organized into three more sections. The next section (Section II) presents the basic data used to calculate the value of non-reciprocal preferences for each reported beneficiary country, adjusted for actual competition (including non-MFN trade) from all other suppliers to the QUAD markets. Section III explains the underlying assumptions of our simulation of a MFN tariff cut and 5 Basing their analysis on the AGOA preference scheme, Olarreaga and Özden (2005) find that on average exporters receive about one third of the tariff rent.
6 Canada, Japan and the US use different tariff codes to differentiate between in-and out-of-quota. In the case of Japan, it has not been possible to make a correlation table between the in-and the out-quota due to the complexity of the tariff schedule. Regarding the EU, the same tariff line numbers are used for both in-and out-of-quota; furthermore only the out-of-quota tariff is available. The methodology that has been adopted is to use out-of-quota duties for Canada, EU and US (except for sugar); Japan has both in-and out-of-quota. 5 presents the results. Section IV concludes. We have also included three short appendices to the paper in order to clarify aspects of our analytical approach. Annex A takes four countries for illustrative purposes and explains how non-discriminatory liberalization will impact preference margins, emphasizing how different the impact can be among countries. Appendix B uses a numerical example to describe exactly how calculations are made of adjusted preference margins -that is, how account is taken of the fact that not all the competitors of a preference-receiving country will be paying MFN tariffs on a given product in a particular market. Annex C analyzes the consequences of a key assumption in our study occasioned by a lack of data -namely that where tariff quotas are employed, the out-of-quota tariff rates are applicable for our preference margin calculations.
II.
The value of non-reciprocal preferences in agriculture
Preference schemes by providers
The data presented below show the relative importance of preferential and non-preferential trade, both from the point of view of preference-giving and preference-receiving countries. Chart 1 and Chart 2
show graphically the import shares in each QUAD market by type of access under the GSP and various LDC schemes respectively. These charts are derived from the data contained in Annex Table   A1 . Chart 1 shows that the share of trade of GSP beneficiaries entering the QUAD markets MFN duty-free varies from some 30 per cent in the case of Japan to almost 70 per cent for Canada. The share of trade that receives preferential treatment, but at a positive duty rate, ranges from zero in the United States to some 25 per cent in the case of the European Union. As for duty-free preferences,
shares vary between about 6 per cent for the EU and 25 per cent for the United States. All of the QUAD countries deny preferential access on some imports subject to positive MFN duties. This represents a 14 per cent share of Canada's imports, and 22 per cent, 50 per cent and 27 per cent respectively for the EU, Japan and the United States. For the QUAD as a whole, the figure is 27 per cent. If the extension of new preferences to beneficiaries who were going to suffer from the erosion of existing preferences were to be considered a possible compensatory mechanism, these figures suggest that considerable scope exists for such a move. Finally, Annex Table A1 provides an interesting indication of the degree of individual commodity dependence of different country groupings. In other words, the product concentration of trade flows can be observed from the last column in Table A1 , which shows the number of tariff lines against which trade occurs. In each case, the numbers are much lower for LDCs than GSP countries. For the QUAD as a whole, GSP beneficiaries record trade against 67 per cent of all agriculture tariff lines.
The comparable figure for the LDCs is only 14 per cent.
Importance of preferences by beneficiaries
We now look at preferences from the point of view of beneficiary countries. 7 Annex Table A2 shows for each beneficiary country the share of their exports by destination market. The data highlight the overall strong reliance, especially of LDCs, on the EU market. Among LDCs, only Myanmar and Madagascar export the largest share of their exports to other markets (Japan and the United States, respectively). In addition, the LDCs are relatively more prone to preference erosion than the GSP beneficiaries, since 37 per cent of their exports enjoy preferential access compared to 23 per cent for GSP beneficiaries. This is borne out by the average preference margin calculations reported in the final two columns of Table 1 . The average preference margin for LDCs in the QUAD drops from 2.5 to 0.1 when competition from other countries benefiting from preferences is taken into account. In the case of GSP beneficiaries, the unadjusted preference margin is only 1.3 and the adjusted margin is 7 In order to facilitate the interpretation of the series of tables in the annex, Appendix A describes country cases for Cameroon, Ecuador, Saint Lucia and Thailand.
8 Appendix B provides a numerical example on how adjusted preference margins are calculated in this paper. 8 negative (-0.4) . This means that at least some developing countries face market conditions worse than their competitors in QUAD markets.
9
In order to generate the data in Table A4 , and for the simulation of the MFN duty reduction reported in the next section, it was necessary to have information on ad valorem equivalent (AVE) tariffs.
Many tariffs in agriculture are expressed as specific duties, and the analysis would have been severely limited in terms of product coverage if we had not used AVEs. The calculation of AVEs can be a complex matter and a number of alternative methodologies are available. For the present purposes, we have based our AVE calculations on the estimates undertaken by the International Trade Centre for the joint ITC/UNCTAD/WTO exercise of reporting to the United Nations on progress towards the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals, except for the United States, where we have used data submission on AVEs to the WTO Secretariat. 10 We were unable to obtain data for a few AVEs problem. For the vast majority of countries, the share of imports for which AVEs are not available is lower than 3 per cent. The aggregate trade share for the countries featured in Table A3 .A was only 2 per cent. The percentage of exports that enjoy preferences in the QUAD markets (Table A3 .A, column 4) and preference margins (Table A4 ) are very different across individual countries. 11 For some countries, 9 Recall that the adjustment for competition is made considering all competitors in the same markets, thus including countries that benefit from reciprocal preferences as well as countries that benefit from nonreciprocal preferences. 10 We did not use AVE data submissions for Canada, the EU and Japan because they record final bound rates, while our data are 2003 applied rates. In addition, we need AVEs for preferences to make our calculations and these were not part of the submissions.
11 Table A3 .A in the annexes reports data on the percentage of exports to the QUAD that benefit from preferential access or MFN treatment by each individual exporting developing country and LDC (beneficiary of exclusively non-reciprocal preferences). In addition, Table A3 .A reports for the same set of country data on how diversified their exports are (this is measured by the percentage of tariff lines on which they export). The figures for the value of the preferences, including the adjustment for competition, for each individual country 9 such as Bangladesh, Belize, Botswana, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Georgia, Guyana, Mauritius, Namibia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, preferential schemes cover over 75 per cent of their total agricultural exports to the QUAD. For other developing countries, preferential trade is not a significant share of their trade.
Among these countries are Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Korea, Maldives, Mali, Mongolia, Myanmar, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, for all of whom preferential access into the QUAD represents less than 5 per cent of their agricultural exports.
It is worth noting that most of these countries (exceptions are Dominican Republic, Myanmar and Republic of Korea) strongly rely on the EU market for their exports (Table A2 ) and that it is their type of market access to the EU that determines their dependence on preference (Table A3 .B).
It is also interesting to note that the countries named above whose preferential trade represents over 75 per cent of total exports also tend to appear among the countries enjoying the highest preference margins from the QUAD, whether adjusted for competition or not (see Table A4 , columns 7 and 1 respectively). In addition, the majority of these countries have a very narrow export base (see Table   A3 .A, columns 6-8). For many of these countries, bananas or sugar account for the high degree of product concentration in their export composition. As will be seen in the next section, these are among the key commodities where preference erosion is a significant consequence of MFN liberalization, particularly in the EU market.
Estimates of the value of preferences are quite sensitive to the specific measure used for the calculations. For example, Chart 3 shows the value of preferences for agricultural exports to the QUAD estimated with and without the margin adjusted for the preferences that the QUAD grants to other countries. 12 For some countries, like Ecuador, Colombia and Thailand, preference margins turn out to be negative when adjusted for competition from other preference beneficiaries. This means that overall, the exports of these countries benefit from less beneficial treatment than other countries competing in the QUAD market.
are reported in Table A4 . Note that the overall figures for developing countries refer to all developing country Members of WTO excluding those with reciprocal preferential agreements as listed in footnote 3. 12 Data for preference margin, adjusted and unadjusted are reported in Table A4 in the annexes. 
III. Simulating a MFN tariff cut in agriculture
In this section we simulate a MFN tariff cut on agricultural products and estimate the impact of this cut on the value of non-reciprocal preferences. Preference erosion is calculated as the change in the value of the preference before and after the MFN cut. We wish to emphasize, once again, that the assumptions described below which define our simulated MFN liberalization scenario should not in any way be taken as a view on our part regarding the desirability or likelihood of a particular outcome in the agricultural negotiations. The scenario simply allows us to illustrate the degree of preference erosion risk that would arise for non-reciprocal preference beneficiaries were a non-discriminatory liberalization episode of this magnitude to occur.
A simulation in agriculture is more complex than a comparable exercise in NAMA because of the multiple parameters used to define the MFN cut. As noted in Section I, we chose to simulate the G20 proposal in relation to market access. In order to do this, four different parameter assumptions were worked into the analysis. First, the tariff reductions involve cuts that vary according to the base rate from which the cut is made. on in-quota and out-of-quota imports for the EU against tariff lines subject to tariff rate quotas (TRQs) and given that only out-of-quota tariffs are available, we simply assumed that all imports against these lines were outside the quota, except for Japan. 14 A consequence of this assumption is that we underestimate overall preference margins when the in-quota preference margin is larger than the out-of-quota preference margin. However, this assumption will translate into an under-estimation of the risk of preference erosion only when the MFN tariff rate, after MFN liberalization, falls below the preferential out-of-quota rate. Another consequence of this assumption is that we do not consider the benefits arising from country-specific quota allocation on an MFN basis. Appendix C provides a detailed explanation of the impact of using preferential and MFN out-of-quota rates to estimate the risk of preference erosion.
EU and US tariff rate quotas in the sugar and banana sectors are treated differently. In the case of cane or beet sugar, the EU has in place a tariff quota system that allocates duty-free quotas entirely to India and to eligible ACP producers according to the Sugar Protocol and Special Preferential Sugar scheme. Since there are no out-of-quota preferences, we would not capture preference margins if we used out-of-quota rates. In order to take into account the actual preferences given to beneficiaries of this EU quota system, we assume that all preferential trade occurs in quota and use an in-quota duty free rate for sugar preferences. A similar operating assumption was made for the US, that has in place a preferential duty free tariff quota system. Box 1 provides further information on the trade regime for sugar in the QUAD.
Box1: Sugar Regime
The sugar regime greatly differs across QUAD countries. Japan does not grant any preference on sugar. Canada provides MFN duty free access on raw sugar for use by sugar refineries in the production of refined sugar used in wine. On other raw sugar Canada applies MFN duties in the range between $22 and $31 per tonne and provides duty free preferences depending upon the preference regime and specific tariff lines.. The EU and the United States regimes for sugar imports share some common features: both the EU and the United States apply a tariff quota regime on sugar and provide domestic support. Because of this, domestic sugar prices are two or three times higher 13 The percentages do not reflect the G-20 proposal. The G-20 proposed that no more than 1 per cent of tariff lines could be declared sensitive products. However, there are other proposals for about 8 per cent (the EC) and 15 per cent (G-10). The 2 per cent and 4 per cent assumptions made in this study were chosen for illustrative purposes only.
14 An exception had to be made for Japan because the complexity of its tariff schedule does not permit a distinction between in-and out-of-quota rates. than prevailing world prices. Therefore, valuable quota rents can be captured by those exporters who hold quota licences. Both the United States and the EU operate a three-tariff quota system for sugar with out-of-quota duties that effectively prohibit access outside the quotas.
In the EU, three different systems apply to cane or beet sugar, raw cane sugar for refining and chemically pure fructose. The tariff quota for cane and beet sugar is reserved entirely for ACP countries and India, and it is in-quota duty free. Mauritius receives the largest share of the quota. The Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative will provide duty-free and quota-free access to sugar originating in LDCs by 1 July 2009. Until this time, LDCs benefit from duty free quota access which increases on an annual basis. Out-of-quota imports for cane or beet sugar are subject to bound duties up to 419€/t. In addition, the EU allocates country-specific quotas to Brazil and Cuba and an MFN quota for raw cane sugar for refining, where the bound in-quota duty is 98€/t, while out-of-quota duty is 339€/t. Finally, the tariff quota on chemically pure fructose is administrated on an MFN basis. The sugar price in the EU is maintained through export refunds. These are intended to cover the difference between the EU domestic sugar market price and the world price. Refunds are paid for sugar beat or cane harvested in the EU and sugar imported under the ACP Protocol and the agreement with India. The EU sugar system has been challenged under the existing WTO rules by other Members.
The United States operates three tariff quota regimes for raw cane sugar, other cane or beet sugars or syrups and sugar-containing products. In the United States, sugar imports are subject to out-of-quota bound duties up to 704$/t plus 8.5 per cent. In-quota rates are significantly lower. For example, for raw cane sugar they are approximately between 9.43-14.61$/t, while the out-of-quota rate is bound at 338.7$/t. Caribbean countries that have quota allocations benefit from duty free access under the GSP and the CBI.
In the case of bananas, we assume for the EU a MFN ad valorem rate of 30 per cent and a duty free preferential rate for ACP countries. 15 This assumption is introduced to reflect the measures relative to the import regime for bananas recently adopted by the Council of the European Union, which entered into force as of 1 January 2006. 16 Box 2 provides further information on the trade regime for bananas in the EU, United States, Canada and Japan.
Box 2: The Banana Regime
Among QUAD countries only the EU maintains a preferential tariff quota for bananas. The United States and Canada grant duty-free MFN treatment to bananas, with the sole exception of a 1.4 per cent tariff on dry plantains in the case of the United States. Japan applies an ad-valorem MFN rate of 20 per cent (from April to September) and 25 per cent (from October to March) on fresh bananas, a rate of 3 per cent on dried bananas, and duty-free access for LDCs.
The EU import regime for bananas has changed several times. The EC regime for bananas has been challenged by other Members under the WTO. For the year 2005, the EU tariff quota system consisted of a total MFN tariff quota of over 3 million metric tons (of which 2.2 million metric tons were bound) subject to a bound in-quota duty of 75 euros per metric ton and a preferential tariff quota 15 The 30 per cent rate assumed here is the estimated tariff equivalent of the MFN tariff rate of 176 euros per tonne formally adopted by the Council of the European Union on 29 November 2005. 16 A request for consultation under the DSU Article 21.5 has been submitted by Honduras to the WTO against the European Communities concerning the measures the latter recently adopted with regard to the banana import regime. Our assumption in no way implies a judgment as to the final outcome in this matter.
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of 750,000 metric tons at zero duty. The final bound out-of-quota rate for non-preferential suppliers was 680 euros per metric ton, while the out-of-quota preferential duty was 380 euros per metric ton. The banana import measures adopted by the Council of the European Union on 29 November 2005 provides that as from 1 January 2006, the tariff rate for bananas shall be 176 euros per tonne and that a zero-duty autonomous tariff quota of 775,000 tonnes should be opened to bananas originating in ACP countries.
Belize, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominica, St. Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines depend significantly on this system, as a large share of their 2003 exports to QUAD countries consist of bananas (20.9 per cent, 9.9 per cent, 4.6 per cent, 26.5 per cent, 62.4 per cent and 24 per cent of total exports, respectively), and the EU absorbs virtually all exports of bananas from most of these countries.
The results of the simulation are reported in Annex Table A5 .A for the QUAD as a whole. Table   A5 .B presents results for the EU and the United States only, but without the assumptions on sensitive product exclusions. Table A5 .A shows, for each beneficiary of non-reciprocal preferences, the change in the aggregate value of preference margins before and after adjustment for competition, and with and without the exclusion of sensitive products. Columns 3, and 8 of the table show the fully adjusted estimate of preference erosion in the cases respectively of no flexibility and 2 per cent flexibility for sensitive products. A separate section in Table A5 .A shows in aggregate form the difference made to the results of using a 4 per cent sensitive product threshold instead of a 2 per cent threshold. Varying the flexibility assumption in this manner makes very little difference to the aggregate simulation results.
Column 3 of Table A5 .A shows that following the MFN tariff reduction, developing countries (excluding LDCs) register a positive margin gain of $256.2 million under the best scheme available to them in each QUAD market. Underlying this net figure are aggregate losses of $205.1 million and gains of $461.3 million. In the case of LDCs, the corresponding numbers are a net gain of $10.4 million, reflecting aggregate losses of $3.8 million and gains of $14.1 million. These results show that if all developing and least-developed countries receiving non-reciprocal preferences are taken together, the net benefit in terms of changes in adjusted preference margins is positive following MFN liberalization. In other words, in terms of our margin analysis, these countries taken together stand to gain more from MFN liberalization 17 than they lose from the consequential preference erosion.
18
However, while the degree of preference erosion may be rather modest in the aggregate, some 17 Recall that the gain from MFN liberalization in this paper arises from a country improved market access to the QUAD relative to the other countries. The figures for the gains from MFN liberalization do not account for the gains arising simply from lower barriers to trade. 18 Note once again that our simulation exercise has excluded developing countries that have reciprocal preference agreements (free trade areas or customs unions) with any QUAD country, notwithstanding the fact that these excluded countries may also benefit from non-reciprocal preferences.
countries are particularly affected, either in terms of the share of lost preference margin in total exports (column 4) or in terms of absolute amounts (column 3).
Columns 5 and 10 indicate the value of trade under tariff lines that continues to attract positive MFN or positive preferential duty rates after the simulated cuts. This information provides an idea as to the scope that may exist for additional preferences that could compensate for the erosion of existing ones.
Granting additional preferences would be a temporary palliative, since additional preferences today imply an additional threat from preference erosion tomorrow. In any event, several of the countries suffering large losses in preference margins, or losses that represent a large share of total trade, do not enjoy much scope for additional preferences in the QUAD markets on the basis of the existing commodity composition of trade.
Before exploring these results in a more disaggregated manner, a few points about the simulations are worth mentioning. First, the fact that the numbers in columns 1-5 and columns 6-10 in Table A5 .A are virtually the same for nearly all countries (with the exception of Argentina, Brazil, China, Fiji, Guatemala, Malawi, Thailand and Zimbabwe) means that preference erosion estimates are barely influenced by the exclusion of 2 per cent or 4 per cent of sensitive products from MFN tariff cuts.
The reason for this is clear. Our assumption that QUAD countries would choose to exclude the tariff lines attracting the highest applied tariffs under the sensitive products rubric means that these are also the lines on which preferential treatment is unlikely to be on offer. Moreover, under a number of the selected tariff lines no trade at all occurs, on account of the high tariffs. Thus, little or no erosion can occur. This does not, of course, mean that the exclusion of sensitive products from MFN reductions has no effect on real market access opportunities -on the contrary, high protection is inhibiting trade.
Annex Table A6 lists the sensitive products selected under our exclusion criterion in each of the QUAD markets, indicating the total trade against these products.
In a recent study, Jean et al. (2006) claim that allowing 2 per cent of tariff lines of sensitive products in developed countries and 4 per cent in developing countries dramatically reduces the effectiveness of tariff reduction as a means of increasing market access. Their result appears to contradict ours. A number of important factors explain the differences in the results. First, Jean et al. assume that countries choose to exclude those products from the MFN formula cut that account for the highest levels of tariff revenues. We assume that countries classify as sensitive the products with the highest tariff rates -in other words, the products that are already the most protected. This means that while the Jean et al. study would exclude highly traded products, our study excludes products with very high duties and mostly little or no trade. We considered it more likely that tariff (protection) patterns and not tariff revenue collections would be more influential in determining the selection of sensitive products. Overall, the conclusion that permitted flexibilities will significantly reduce the gains from a plausible tariff-cutting scenario under the Doha negotiations would appear questionable at best. Nevertheless, it is important to note that results are likely to change, perhaps significantly, for different hypotheses on the sensitive products. What would the results have been, for example, if we had selected products for exclusion on which the risk of preference erosion was most acute rather than the products that were currently the most protected?
Second
Another notable feature of our results is that the 100 per cent cap is not relevant for non-sensitive products. In order for the cap to operate in our analysis, a tariff would have to exceed 400 per cent before it was cut -under the G20 proposal, a tariff of 400 per cent would attract a 75 per cent cut, bringing it down to 100 per cent.
Turning to the question of which countries are the most susceptible to preference erosion, Column 4
of Table A5 .A shows the calculated value of preference erosion risk as a share of total agriculture exports for each country. The countries most severely affected in these terms are Belize (8.1 per cent), Botswana (15.5 per cent), Cameroon (4.9 per cent), Dominica (8.9 per cent), Fiji (4.3 per cent), Guyana (4.1 per cent), Mauritius (7 per cent), Namibia (9.5 per cent), Saint Kitts and Nevis (4.7 per cent), Saint Lucia (12.1 per cent), and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (11.9 per cent), and Swaziland (4.3 per cent). Table A5 .B indicates that all these countries suffer from preference erosion primarily in the EU market. Table A7 examines the commodity composition of preference erosion risk for 13 of the most severely affected countries. 20 Fruit and vegetables (mainly denoting bananas) and sugar represent the highest product shares of exports to the QUAD for most of these countries and constitute the bulk of the threat of preference erosion. The table shows that the adjustment for competition from other traders in the QUAD markets has relatively less impact on the preference margin for bananas than for sugar in most of cases. This is because more than 75 per cent of the banana market was already subject to MFN duties in 2003.
The situation with respect to sugar is somewhat different from that of bananas. In Columns 1 and 2 of Table A5 .A, many beneficiaries of sugar preferences appear to lose significantly from preference erosion in terms of overall export shares. But after the adjustment for competition from other suppliers, including preferential suppliers, the preference erosion estimate falls dramatically. This is because unlike in the case of bananas, where a good deal of competition comes from non-preferential or less favoured sources, competition in the EU sugar market is predominantly among countries enjoying the same favourable treatment in the importing market. More than 90 per cent of EU cane sugar (HS 17011) imports are from countries that benefit from the EU Sugar Protocol. Adjustment for this competition offers a more realistic view of what is really at stake in the sugar market and demonstrates that preference margins are simply not worth as much to individual countries when many other countries are enjoying the same advantages. The countries for whom this is true include Barbados, Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica, Mauritius, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Swaziland, and Trinidad and
Tobago. An important point to note here is that our analysis of the vulnerability of sugar exporters to preference erosion is based only on what happens to tariffs. We do not include any consideration is what is likely to occur in the EU market when the impending reform of the guaranteed price system for countries under the Sugar Protocol takes effect.
Returning briefly to Table A7 , we note that other products vulnerable to preference erosion in these selected countries include coffee and tea, sugar, alcoholic beverages and tobacco.. For the group of 13 most affected countries, Table A8 reports the three most important export products at HS 6 digit level, their shares of total exports to the QUAD markets, and their average adjusted preference margins. It is interesting to note that, except for Jamaica, for each of these countries, only three quite narrowly defined products account for more than 75 per cent of total exports to the QUAD.
IV. Conclusions
By way of conclusion, it is worth emphasizing once again the nature of our calculations and how they should be interpreted. Essentially, what we observe in our calculations of preference erosion is how preference margins are reduced when a MFN tariff reduction is introduced. We make the estimates of preference erosion for individual countries taking into account the fact that competing suppliers into given markets may also enjoy preferential treatment. This makes it unrealistic simply to calculate changes in preference margins in terms of differences between MFN and preferential duty rates on bilateral trade flows -the competition must be reckoned with in order to appreciate what is really at stake. The adjustment of preference margin calculations in this manner makes a major difference for some product lines in certain markets.
But what we are calculating is not the trade consequences of preference erosion. We only compute changes in preference margins and assign them a monetary value by multiplying estimated erosion margins by the associated trade flow (under the relevant tariff line). This gives us a magnitude that can be compared with trade flows, but it is not an estimate of changes in trade flows. What happens to trade flows after a policy change will depend on how different suppliers react to changes in the conditions of competition and how consumers react to changes in relative prices. It is for this reason that we often refer to preference erosion risk in the paper. The estimates are useful in identifying relative risks among countries, but they should not be taken as indicators of trade impact, and far less as income or welfare consequences of trade liberalization.
A general caveat to this analysis also bears repetition. The trade liberalization process in agriculture is complex. We have had to make a range of assumptions in order to calculate our estimates. These have been spelled out in the paper. By choosing a single simulation scenario, we are obviously excluding other possible outcomes where preference erosion risk could assume different dimensions.
Perhaps the most sensitive and potentially influential assumption in the paper concerns the sensitive product exclusions, particularly in terms of the choice importing Members will make of which lines to exclude. In our simulation, we have assumed that the lines chosen would be those carrying the highest applied tariff rates. But what if the choice included products in respect of which preference erosion risk was most acute? In that case, the preference erosion risk would be greatly mitigated, with the resultant loss of potential trading opportunities for non-preferential or less preferred suppliers. As it is, in our paper sensitive product exclusions turn out to have a small impact on preference erosion and Trinidad and Tobago, which suffer relatively high agricultural preference erosion risk, have been excluded on the basis of the negligible share of agricultural exports in these countries' total exports. risk, precisely because the highly protected products chosen for exclusion from formula cuts are traded relatively little.
By assuming that trade flows subject to tariff rate quotas would occur outside quota values, we could have under-stated or over-stated the preference erosion risk. We will also have over-simplified stories in such product lines as sugar and bananas, where the existence of TRQs renders market outcomes more complex than our analysis has allowed. We do not, however, believe that these oversimplifications have fundamentally undermined our estimates -rather, they may have simply made them more approximate.
Other notable assumptions that have influenced our estimates are intrinsic to the choice of a particular negotiating proposal. These include the designation of tariff ranges and the MFN cuts to be applied to these ranges, the size of the sensitive product designation, and the value of the cap. While the magnitude of the preference erosion risk would be affected to a degree by changes in these parameter assumptions, it is less obvious that relative impacts among affected Members would change very much.
The main conclusions of this study may be summarized as follows:
 Like NAMA, the overall estimates of risks from preference erosion constitute small numbers.
The aggregate estimated risk for all non-reciprocal preference-receiving Members listed in Table A5 .A is a positive value of $266.6 million, of which the LDCs account for $10.4
million. These positive numbers should be interpreted to mean that overall, developing countries do not face any preference erosion risk -on the contrary, they would benefit in preference erosion terms from a MFN cut. Underlying these net positive numbers, however, are total losses of $208.8 million ($3.8 million for LDCs) and total gains of $475.4 million ($10.4 million for LDCs).
 Unlike in NAMA, the risk of preference erosion in agriculture is far more concentrated in terms of particular products and countries. The most affected products include bananas (Belize, Cameroon, Dominica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Swaziland); sugar (Barbados, Belize, Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica, Mauritius, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Swaziland) and beverages and spirits (Barbados, Belize, Jamaica). Much of the impact occurs in the EU market.
 On the basis of assumptions made about the composition of products regarded as sensitive, the sensitive product exclusions have almost no effect on preference erosion, albeit for sugar in the United States. This would continue to be the case to a large degree if the share of sensitive products were allowed to increase, but only if the same assumption was made as to 19 the criterion for the choice of products. If the composition of products chosen as sensitive moved in the direction of including those where preference erosion was a significant risk, then the picture could change significantly. Moreover, we have made no attempt in the paper to consider how far quotas may be expanded under current tariff-rate-quota arrangements by way of compensation for formula cut exclusions.
APPENDIX

A. Country-specific illustrations on preference erosion risk
In order to illustrate the very diverse risks at the country level from preference erosion,we have selected two ACP Members -Cameroon and St. Lucia -and two other countries -Ecuador and Thailand -that benefit less from preferences in the QUAD markets.
The two ACP Members rely heavily on the EU market, which takes in more than 95 per cent of their exports to the QUAD (Table A2 ). Both countries enjoy considerable preference margins, but only in the EU market, for their export products (Table A4 ). The trade-weighted preference margins are 29
per cent for St. Lucia, which is linked to its preferential treatment for bananas, and 12 per cent for Cameroon, where it is related to a slightly larger basket of goods dominated by cocoa and bananas. In fact, at less then 1 per cent, the preference margin for cocoa is negligible (Table A7 ). The adjusted weighted preference margins are not much lower (22 per cent and 9 per cent respectively), which
indicates that their export markets are fairly well shielded from other important suppliers. In the case of Cameroon, however, preferential access covers less than half of total exports (Table A3. A and B), as the larger part of its exports enter the QUAD markets -essentially the EU -MFN duty-free.
Ecuador and Thailand trade in all QUAD markets (Table A2 ). However, they hardly benefit from any preference margin in any of their markets (Table A4) . Thailand faces non-zero MFN duties for twothirds of its exports. For Ecuador this share is over one-third (Table A3 .A). In the case of the EU market, the MFN dutiable export shares increase to 80 per cent and 61 per cent, respectively (Table   A3 .B). The weighted preference margins in the QUAD are just 3 per cent and 1 per cent for Ecuador and Thailand, respectively. Taking into account the competition from other preferential suppliers the adjusted weighted preference margins become negative (-2 per cent) in both countries. This implies that on average, for their respective products, other exporters with sizable market share have better preferences than the GSP schemes enjoyed by Ecuador and Thailand. In the case of Ecuador, this is clearly the effect of the EU banana preferences. In the case of Thailand, it covers a broader spectrum of products. GSP preferences do not seem to give these countries effective preferential access when the preferential arrangements enjoyed by competitors supplying those markets are taken into account.
a lack of product diversification is a key factor that increases the preference erosion effect (Table A8 ).
In the case of St. Lucia, exports of bananas alone account for 94 per cent of its agricultural exports.
Cameroon's two major export products -cocoa and bananas -are fairly evenly split, with a combined share of 84 per cent. Such high product concentration renders these economies very vulnerable to 22 external shocks, such as those resulting from preference erosion. Ecuador has a slightly more diversified export structure and Thailand is a very diversified exporter.
Differences in the impact of preference erosion among countries are, of course, reflected in our tariffcutting simulation. The reductions in preference margins resulting from the cuts in the MFN duties is quite significant for the two ACP Members (Table A5. (Table A5 .B).
The reductions in exports resulting from increased competition in their export markets is likely to be much larger. Estimates of such medium-term developments can only be predicted with more sophisticated dynamic models, and even then they will heavily rely on various assumptions. The figures for the change in the preference value should be thought of more as a cross-country comparative index than as a monetary value that would reflect associated adjustment costs.
Looking at other countries in a similar situation, one can identify bananas and sugar as accounting for a large share of the loss of preference value in several of the small island economies. High export concentration also precludes the option of opening additional product lines for additional preferences.
Bigger and often more efficient agricultural producers like Ecuador and Thailand, on the other hand, appear to gain from MFN liberalization in terms of preference erosion margins. In adjusted terms, both countries gain better market access and improve their adjusted preference value by a significant amount -an amount which is larger in absolute terms than the negative figures shown for most of the smaller economies. Furthermore, there is considerable scope in both countries to benefit from additional preferences or from further MFN cuts, although only in the EU market (Table A5 .B). The latter implied gains would significantly exceed the gain in the adjusted preference value as a result of our simulated MFN reductions. As mentioned above, such medium-term dynamic effects are likely to outweigh the static calculations presented here in this paper.
B. Calculating adjusted preference margins: a numerical example
The purpose of calculating adjusted preference margins is to establish the real conditions of competition among suppliers to a given import market. Our calculations involve three steps. First, we calculate the adjusted value of the preference. Then we apply the tariff reduction formula on the Traditionally, the preference margin for each country (column 5) is calculated as the difference between the MFN tariff rate and the actual applied rate (that is, the preferential rate or the MFN rate depending on whether a country receives a preference or not), and the value of the preference (column 6) will simply be the product of the preference margin and the value of the imports.
For each country we calculate the adjusted preference margin as the difference between the average rate applied to the country's competitors (that in the table is called adjusted MFN rate and it is shown in column 7) and the actual applied rate to that country (column 2), where, for example, the adjusted MFN rate for country A is the trade-weighted average between 5 per cent and 10 per cent, the tariff rates applied to B and C. The adjusted preference value is simply the adjusted preference margin times the value of imports. It is interesting to note that the adjusted preference margin is negative for country A, since its exports suffer worse than average treatment in country Q's market.
Assume now that country Q decides to reduce MFN import tariffs. The second panel of the table (
Step 2) describes the situation after a MFN tariff cut of 25 per cent. The MFN rate falls from 20 per cent to 15 per cent. By assumption, import values do not change. Following the same methodology described in Step 1, we calculate both the unadjusted and the adjusted preference margin and the value of the preference. It is interesting to note that this approach allows us to capture the benefit a country facing the MFN tariff -country A in this example -enjoys in terms of the reduction of its disadvantage relative to B and C, the preferred countries.
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Changes before and after the application of the MFN tariff cut are reported in the third panel (Step 3) of the table. The figures for the adjusted values of preference erosion are shown in column 9. That is, they are the difference between the adjusted preference value before (column 9, Step 1) and after the tariff cut (column 9, Step 2)
Step 
C. The effect of using out-of-quota rates to estimate preference erosion
In order to clarify the implications of using out-of-quota rates to estimate preference erosion, we need to distinguish two cases: (i) when the MFN regime is quota-free and (ii) when there is a MFN quota.
(i) MFN quota-free
Suppose that country A's imports of good j from country B are subject to a preferential TRQ. That is, imports up to a quota limit are permitted at an in-quota tariff of 10 per cent, while the out-of-quota preferential tariff is 20 per cent. In addition, assume that the MFN tariff is 50 per cent. In this situation, the value of the preference will be given by the total value of the revenue forgone (i.e. the difference between the MFN and the relevant preferential rate times the import value). Graphically, the value of the preference can be represented by the total shaded area in Chart 1.a.
Because of data limitations, in this paper we use out-of-quota rates to estimate the value of preferences. Under the circumstances described above, our working assumption provides an estimated value of the preference which is lower than the actual value by the value of the dotted area. MFN rate falls below the out-of-quota preferential rate (to 15 percent, say), we will underestimate the risk of preference erosion by the value of the dot-shaded area.
Chart 1.b: Preference erosion under preferential quotas (ii) MFN quota
In order to analyse the consequences of using out-of-quota rate to estimate the risk of preference erosion in the case MFN tariff-rate quotas, we need to distinguish between the case when the preferential regime is quota-free and when it is subject to a quota. Suppose, first, that country A imposes a MFN tariff rate quota on imports of good i with an in-quota rate of 10 per cent and an outof-quota rate of 40 per cent. In addition, country A provides preferential treatment to imports of country B on good i at a preferential rate of 20 per cent. Suppose that following liberalization, the out-of-quota MFN rate is reduced to 30 per cent. Since there is no change in the treatment of in-quota imports, the value of the preference actually eroded will be that of the vertical-line shaded area.
However, since we do not distinguish between in and out-of-quota trade, we will overestimate the risk of preference erosion by the dot-shaded area. The implications of using out-of-quota rates to estimate the risk of preference erosion when there are both preferential and MFN tariff rate quotas are more complex. A number of possible situations can emerge, depending on whether the in-quota preference margin is equal, smaller or greater than the out-of-quota preference margin.
In general, the use of out-of-quota rates may result in an under-estimation of preference erosion risk when two conditions are satisfied: the out-of-quota preference margin is smaller than the in-quota preference margin, and the MFN tariff rate after liberalization falls below the preferential out-of-quota rate. Data for the United States and Canada show that the use of out-of-quota rates does not have any significant impact on our estimates for preference erosion. Unfortunately, in the case of the EU, we are not able to quantify the probability that our simulations underestimate the risk of preference erosion. However, data in Table A9 provides some indication for the case of MFN quotas. The table shows that only 16 developing countries and one LDC have more than 20 per cent of exports to the EU under bound TRQs. Of these, only seven countries (Belize, Botswana, Cameroon, Jamaica, Mauritius, Namibia and Swaziland) have weighted average applied preferential rates greater than zero and therefore present a risk of underestimation of preference erosion. In the case of Japan, we were unable to distinguish between in-quota and out-of-quota rates. 
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Country
EU
Bilateral imports
Imports (%) % of ag. sub-headings with at least one national Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes 7 Table A9 Imports of agricultural products into the EU from preference beneficiaries by type of market access
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